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Abstract 
As the second-largest economy in the world and as the largest provider of development assistance, the 
EU is a major actor and agenda-setter in international development. This paper seeks to examine the 
tools used by the EU in providing assistance and the ways in which its approach to development are 
different to those adopted by other major actors. The EU's use of ODA and market access are 
distinguished as two major tools employed by the Union to promote its vision for development. Major 
challenges to the EU's pre-eminence in the field are also outlined, particularly focusing on challenges 
arising from the emergence of the Chinese model of development assistance. Drawing on reports 
produced by the European Commission and academic studies, therefore, this paper finds that while 
there are inherent shortfalls in its approach, with strong normative underpinnings and a long-term 
oriented approach, the EU remains a successful and prominent actor in international development. 
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Introduction 
Historically, development as a concept has denoted that countries have varying levels 
of "development" based on their economic status, giving rise to a binary notion that 
there are developed and developing nations in the world. In the 21st century, 
development as a policy area has evolved from a purely economic outlook towards 
emphasising a comprehensive socio-political and economic process through which 
developing nations can achieve sustainable growth (Gänzle et al., 2012, p.2). The 
European Union (EU), as an economic superpower with historic colonial links to the 
developing world thus, has a significant role in global development discourse. Since 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, development policy has been an EU community 
competence and is based on the principles of promoting sustainable development, 
eradicating poverty, and integrating developing nations into the global economy 
(Mold, 2007, p.47). Therefore, with a strong commitment to translating these 
principles into practical and effective projects, the EU has become an agenda-setter in 
global development and employs various methods to assist developing nations. In 
particular, the economic power of the Union has allowed it to become the largest aid 
donor in the world, a role which it has utilised to foster comprehensive and tailored 
developmental activities, as evidenced by the EU's involvement in Afghanistan. 





field and serve as an incentive for developing nations to accept EU conditionalities that 
promote changes for sustainable economic and socio-political development. However, 
the EU's approach does have inherent shortfalls and faces challenges from new actors 
such as China, who take a less intrusive approach in providing development assistance. 
Thus, while there are shortcomings in its approach, guided by normative and practical 
policies, the EU still stands as a credible and successful actor leading the field of 
development (Davies, & Nilsson, 2020, p.2).  
EU Official Development Assistance and the Example of 
Afghanistan 
One advantage the EU has over other actors, stemming from its position as the largest 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) donor in the world, is its ability to use the 
"power of the purse" (Gänzle et al., 2012, p.23) to influence the global development 
agenda. The first Lomé Convention established the foundation of the EU's role as an 
international donor by creating ODA funding organs such as the European 
Development Fund (EDF) (Mold, 2007, p.41). While agencies for distributing ODA are 
a global staple, the EU's focus on using these funds to achieve the aims set out in the 
Maastricht treaty and the more recent European Consensus on Development (2017), 
based on the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are not universal. In some 
regards, therefore, the EU's development outlook is more progressive, with the EU 
championing projects which are comparatively altruistic, a prime example of which is 
the slow phasing out of tied aid. Thus, while other actors like the US still provide up to 
50% of their food aid with tied conditions that benefit US producers, as of January 
2020, over 92% of the EU's ODA was untied, allowing recipient nations to tailor aid 
funding to their needs (Holden, 2009;2016, p.126-130). The ability to tailor aid is 
another EU strength, as it ensures that ODA funding meets the needs of the local 
population and builds the capacity of recipient nations to take charge of the 
development process in the long run. The EU thus funds tools such as the Instrument 
for Stability (IfS) through the European External Action Service to create the necessary 
conditions for development activities to be effective (Gänzle et al., 2012, p.131-133). 
The IfS is designed to react to pressing global crises that threaten stability and the rule 
of law before they deteriorate further, allowing the EU to establish peace and stability 
without the need for military intervention (Biscop, 2005;2016, p.25). Through funding 
programs such as these, the EU establishes "meaningful engagements" (Biscop, 
2005;2016, p.67) with developing nations, ensuring that its ODA has a lasting impact 
not just on economic growth but also on socio-political conditions. Moreover, EU ODA 
is not only donor oriented but also strongly committed to multilateral cooperation in 
order to ensure maximum effectiveness and cohesion of aid policies and projects. With 
international development being an incredibly clustered space, the EU's internal 
efforts in achieving policy cohesion, as well as its sustained commitment to working 
with other national, multilateral, and non-governmental organisations, have ensured 
that redundant and overlapping aid activities have diminished (Gänzle et al., 2012, 
p.239). Ultimately, therefore, the EU's willingness to adopt and implement 
cosmopolitan ideals through its ODA gives the Union greater credibility as a genuinely 
altruistic actor (Del Biondo et al., 2008, p.121).  
An example that showcases the impact and effectiveness of EU ODA is the case of 
Afghanistan. With a myriad of socio-economic issues and defined by the United 
Nations as a Least Developed Country (LDC), the EU has had a significant role in the 
development of Afghanistan in the 21st century. As the largest recipient of EU ODA, 
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with 1.4 billion Euros invested in the country between 2014 and 2020, the EU views 
development in the region as a strategic means to tackle radicalism and foster greater 
regional and global stability (European Commission, 2019). The EU has thus funded 
activities that work to establish peace, democracy, and essential social services as a 
means to ensure that development is sustainable and controlled by the people of the 
country (Biscop, 2005;2016, p.25). Therefore, while the EU's activities in Afghanistan 
are numerous, its nature and impact can be exemplified by efforts in the health and 
governance fields. For example, EU funding for the Law and Order Trust Fund 
effectively supports the payroll of 124,000 employees of the Ministry of Interior in 
charge of maintaining the rule of law in the country. Its activities in health have also 
resulted in 296 new health facilities which serve the most remote and overlooked 
regions, helping to combat malnutrition and mortality rates in the country (European 
Commission, 2019). Hence, EU ODA stands apart from traditional military and 
infrastructure funding often provided to Afghanistan and instead focuses on grassroots 
activities aimed at achieving stability and sustainable development. Thus, as 
showcased by its efforts in Afghanistan, while many nations are active donors, the EU's 
commitment to progressive principles and efforts to make ODA truly recipient-
oriented make it a leader amongst global developmental actors.  
The Trade-Development Nexus 
While the EU's role as the biggest global aid donor can be viewed as active external 
involvement, the trade-development nexus, established as one of the EU's 
development policy cornerstones, is a more passive means through which the EU helps 
developing nations. The EU has used trade as a development tool since the Treaty of 
Rome in 1958, which, at the time, sought to provide preferential market access to 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, most of which were former European 
colonies. Now, with considerably more trading power, the EU uses market access and 
a scheme of trade preferences under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) as 
an incentive for developing nations to liberalise economically and foster growth (Del 
Biondo et al., 2008, p.111-114). While almost all developed economies use GSP as a trade 
tool, the EU's application of the concept is uniquely stratified into a pyramid of trade 
preferences with four distinct stages. Developed nations are at the bottom and receive 
little to no benefits. In the second stage, the standard GSP scheme is applied to lower-
middle and middle-income nations, entailing partial exemption of customs duties and 
alleviation of 2/3 of the tariffs. The next stage, the GSP+ category, removes all tariffs 
and duties and is intended to benefit low-income and vulnerable nations. The final 
stage of the EU preference system is reserved for LDCs who have access to the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. The EBA benefits the LDCs as all their goods 
and services gain quota, tariff and duty-free access to the European market. The 
stratified preference system not only allows the EU to tailor assistance according to a 
nation's level of development but also makes it easier to apply specific conditionalities 
to foster more comprehensive development in the most vulnerable nations (Del Biondo 
et al., 2008, p.113-115). Therefore, the GSP+ and EBA schemes require that nations sign 
27 major international conventions (Del Biondo et al., 2008, p.125), ranging from 
adherence to good governance standards to compliance with the Paris Agreement 
(European Commission, 2020a, p.2). 
Furthermore, the uniqueness of its GSP model also means that engaging with the EU 
has specific benefits not found with other developed nations. One major strength of the 





of the US. The American system, which does not have as many stratified levels, imposes 
relatively strict conditions for all developing nations (Jones et al., 2011, p.2-3). For 
example, the lack of differentiation in the US's application of GSP means that low-
income nations such as Pakistan, which produce similar products to those of India, a 
much larger economy, would have to compete on the same level. In contrast, in the EU 
system, India falls under the standard GSP scheme with fewer benefits, while Pakistan 
gets more preference under the GSP+ scheme, levelling the playing field (Jones et al., 
2011, p.2). Another advantage of trading with the EU under the preferential trade 
system is that industries in the developing nations strengthen over time to become 
competitive in a free market. This is because the GSP conditionalities of the EU bring 
production, manufacturing, and labour standards in developing nations to 
International levels. The EU's market power also means greater job creation and 
technical assistance for developing nations, all of which, as put forth by Jones et al. 
(2011), acts as a means of "apprenticeship and benchmarking" (p.8). These positive 
impacts are evident in the case of Sri Lanka, where since the turn of the Century, GSP+ 
conditionalities have reduced child labour numbers from 16% to 1% (European 
Commission, 2020a, p.2-8). Bangladesh has also benefited under the EBA category, 
with the favourable access to the European market helping create an estimated 5 
million jobs between 2018-2019 (European Commission, 2020a, p.2-8).  
The EU also uses its trade policy to help resource-dependent nations, especially those 
that are over-dependent on agriculture, forestry and mineral extraction for economic 
growth as they are vulnerable to market fluctuations. This form of assistance entails 
the free transfer of technology and technical assistance to enable developing nations to 
adapt and diversify their economies and societies (European Commission, 2011, p.5-
11). This comprehensive commitment is exemplified by the European Union's Energy 
Initiative (EUEI), the EU's framework to ensure that developing nations have the 
necessary skills and means to independently control the development agenda 
(European Commission, 2011, p.25). One of the most successful policies implemented 
under the EUEI was the Timber Regulation rules adopted by the EU in 2013. The 
regulations required producers in developing nations to enact a "due diligence" system 
to ensure that timber brought to the European market is not harvested illegally or 
unsustainably. This policy substantially reduced illegal timber imports by more than 
25% (European Commission, 2011, p.28-31). Ultimately, therefore, EU conditionalities 
aim to lay the groundwork for successful long-term development by incentivising 
developing nations to undertake socio-economic reforms in return for preferential 
market access. 
Shortfalls in the EU's Approach to Development and the 
Challenges Posed by the Chinese Model  
While the EU is a preeminent actor in development, it does face systemic challenges 
over the distribution and implementation of its aid, and questions still remain over the 
actual impact created by its projects. The main criticism is that despite offering flexible 
policies and need-based allocation of ODA, less than 10% of the EU funding reaches 
the LDCs where it is needed most (Barbagallo et al., 2019, p.19-20), with 16 of the 
poorest nations receiving only 8% of EU funding (Barbagallo et al., 2019, p.5). 
Moreover, as a sizeable supranational entity, the EU has an extensive bureaucratic 
system, making the process of receiving aid infamously slow. This fact is backed up by 
figures from 2007 to 2013, during which period only 30% of the contracted aid had 
been paid (Bossuyt, 2018, p.12). Therefore, the slow process and inherently long-term 
Kumaresan, ANZJES 13(1) 
 
118 
nature of EU aid projects have raised questions over the efficacy of EU ODA in the 
short-term, especially considering EU assistance is often accompanied by expensive 
and substantial conditionalities. Questions over the normative underpinnings of EU 
ODA have also been further exasperated by the perceived selective application of 
conditionalities on weaker states dependent on aid. This is because, due to geopolitical 
considerations, larger nations such as Indonesia receive the benefits of EU funding and 
preferential market access without facing the same level of EU interference in political 
and economic policy (Mold, 2007, p.248). This leads to a significant challenge facing 
the EU in global development, which has been the rise of new powers such as China, 
which have ramped up development activities following a different approach to 
development.  
The friction between the policies of the EU and China are in direct conflict in Central 
Asia, where local governments, most of which are authoritarian or oligarchic, find 
Chinese aid more attractive due to the lack of conditionalities (Bossuyt, 2018, p.14). 
Moreover, while the EU fundamentally tries to achieve development through stable, 
inclusive and sustainable methods, China focuses on rapid economic growth through 
infrastructure investment. China thus helps developing nations less through ODA and 
more through concessional loans and state subsidised investments in infrastructure 
and natural resource extraction (Bossuyt, 2018, p.2-9). Compared to the EU, therefore, 
Chinese assistance is more prevalent and preferred in Central Asia, especially since 
immediate results are guaranteed. This was evidenced when Chinese President Xi 
Jinping offered a loan and investment package of 10 billion dollars to Kazakhstan and 
48 billion dollars for the entire region in 2013. In contrast, the EU's focus is limited to 
the poorest nations in the region, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who are willing 
to meet the EU's conditionalities (Bossuyt, 2018, p.6-9). However, while China does 
challenge the EU model for development by funding flashy projects and promising 
immediate results, it does not help developing nations build capacity in the long run. 
This lack of focus on sustainable forms of development is a weakness in the Chinese 
development policy, as without good governance and other prerequisites fostered by 
EU conditionalities, the long term prospects for developing nations would be negative 
(Bossuyt, 2018, p.15). Furthermore, in discussing the shortfalls of the EU's approach, 
it is also worth noting that the EU as an aid actor is still constrained by internal politics 
of member states and geopolitical factors which influence the development policies of 
the Union. Thus, while LDCs are somewhat neglected by the EU approach and 
questions remain over the immediate results of EU ODA, there have been recent 
commitments to refining the process. (European Commission, 2020b). In particular, 
the commitment in 2017 to the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) seeks to 
refocus and streamline EU projects towards result-oriented and effective development 
activities. The adoption of the PCD is, therefore, indicative of the EU's commitment to 
refine its methods, which will ensure that the EU remains a relevant actor in the 
development field (European Commission, 2020b).  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, therefore, the EU's considerable economic power, combined with its 
comprehensive approach to development, make it an effective global actor in the field 
of development. The "power of the purse" allows the EU to positively influence the 
global development agenda, particularly by championing progressive policies and 
setting an example for other donor nations to follow. This has been witnessed in 





its focus on grassroots programmes that improve socio-economic conditions and foster 
sustainable growth for the long run. Moreover, its ability to use trade and market 
access as incentives are other highly effective tools at the EU's disposal, which have 
been employed to help developing nations strengthen their economies by offering 
preferential access. Through conditionalities that accompany trade incentives, the EU 
has also been able to bring standards relating to labour and environment to 
international standards, thereby building capacity and integrating developing states 
into the global economy. Finally, while new and less intrusive approaches to 
development have emerged from emerging powers such as China, the grassroots and 
sustainable approach to helping developing nations espoused by the EU is unparalleled 
in the global context. Thus, comparatively, the EU stands out as a progressive and 
altruistic actor leading international development activities and discourse.  
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